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been found to be a co-owner of the servitude, prescription could
not have run against him under the doctrine that as between co-
owners the mineral rights are indivisible and their mutual con-
sent is necessary in order to exercise them.26
In conclusion, the foregoing may be restated as follows: As
between co-owners of a mineral servitude, that servitude is indi-
visible. This is merely another way of saying that the rights of
servitudes are indivisible under Article 656 of the Civil Code.
However, the servitude itself may be divided by designating the
superficial area to which the rights alienated are to apply. This
act creates another servitude out of the original one granted. The
sale by the landowner of a fractional part of the minerals creates
an entire and distinct servitude carrying with it all the rights
necessary for its exercise, and also the obligation of distributing
to the other owners of mineral rights their just proportion of the
minerals.
WILLIAM M. SHAW
JURISDICTION AND VENUE OF THE ACTION OF
NULLITY IN LOUISIANA
Articles 604 to 608 inclusive of the Code of Practice of 1870
contain the provisions of our law relative to the annulment of
judgments. The causes for which the nullity of a judgment may
be demanded fall into two classes-vices in the form of proceed-
ing and vices which go to the merits of the case.1
The vices of form which render a judgment null are listed in
Article 606 of the Code of Practice:
"1. If a judgment has been rendered, even contradictorily,
against a person disqualified by law from appearing in a suit,
as a minor without the assistance of his curator or tutor .... 2
"2. If the defendant, although qualified to appear in a cause,
have been condemned by default, without having been cited;
"3. When the judgment, though clothed with all the neces-
sary formalities, has, nevertheless, been given by a judge in-
26. Gulf Refining Co. v. Carroll, 145 La. 229, 82 So. 227 (1919); Gulf Refin-
ing Co. v. Hayne, 148 La. 340, 86 So. 891 (1921).
1. Art. 605, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
2. The last clause of this subdivision, which reads "or a married woman
without the authorization of her husband or of the court" has been rendered.
obsolete by La. Act 283 of 1928.
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competent to try the suit, either owing to the amount in dis-
pute, or to the nature of the cause;
"4. If the defendant has not been legally cited, and has not
entered appearance, joined issue, or had not a regular judg-
ment by default taken against him."
The causes for nullity set forth in this article are exclusive and
not merely illustrative, hence no other "vice of form" will serve
as a basis for an action to annul.3 Judgments vitiated by the de-
fects of form enumerated in Article 606 are absolute nullities and
are subject to collateral attack 4 in proper proceedings 5 at any
time.6 These vices may therefore be termed "absolute" vices.
Article 607 states the causes for nullity which pertain to the
merits of the case:
"A definitive judgment may be annulled in all cases where
it appears that it has been obtained through fraud, or other ill
practices on the part of the party in whose favor it was ren-
dered; as if he had obtained the same by bribing the judge or
the witnesses, or by producing forged documents, or by deny-
ing having received the payment of a sum, the receipt of
which the defendant had lost or could not find at the time, but
has found since the rendering of the judgment."
The examples of fraud or other ill practices set forth in this
article are not exclusive but merely illustrative. As a matter of
fact, our courts are vested with broad discretion in determining
whether there has been such conduct on the part of the party in
whose favor the judgment was rendered as to amount to a cause
for nullity. They will generally set aside any judgment the en-
forcement of which would be "unconscientious and inequitable."'
While an action to set aside a judgment affected with an absolute
nullity may be brought at any time,8 the action to vacate a judg-
ment obtained through fraud or other ill practices must be
3. Blanck v. Speckman, 23 La. Ann. 146 (1871); Payne & Joubert v.
Schaeffer-Gaiennie Co., 119 La. 382, 44 So. 134 (1907). See Tarver v. Quinn, 149
La. 368, 371, 89 So. 216, 217 (1921).
4. Edwards v. Whited, 29 La. Ann. 647 (1877); Conery v. Rotchford,
Brown & Co., 30 La. Ann. 692 (1878); Bledsoe v. Erwin, 33 La. Ann. 615 (1881);
Decuir v. Deculr, 105 La. 481, 29 So. 932 (1901).
5. McClelland v. District Household of Ruth, 151 So. 246 (La. App. 1933).
In this case It was held to be error for a district judge to grant a new trial,
after the delay in which application therefor had expired, on the ground that
the first judgment was an absolute nullity.
6. Art. 612, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
7. Succession of Gilmore, 157 La. 130, 102 So. 94 (1924); Hanson v. Haynes,
170 So. 257 (La. App. 1936).
8. Art. 612, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
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brought within one year after the cause for nullity has been dis-
covered.9 In such a case the burden of proving that the vice was
discovered within a year of the commencement of the action of
nullity rests on the plaintiff.10
Judgments obtained by fraud or other ill practices must be
attacked by a direct action." These vices therefore will be re-
ferred to as "relative" vices.
The problem to be dealt with in the present comment con-
cerns which court is the proper one in which to bring an action
of nullity. Article 608 provides:
"The nullity of judgment may be demanded from the same
court which has rendered the same, or from the court of ap-
peal before which the appeal from such judgment was taken,
pursuant to the provisions hereafter expressed."
In an early case, Melangon's Heirs v. Broussard,2 an action was
instituted in the district court to annul a judgment which had
been passed upon on appeal by the supreme court. The ground
urged as giving rise to nullity was fraud in procuring the judg-
ment. It was held that under Article 6081 a district court was pro-
hibited from entertaining an action to annul a judgment passed
upon by an appellate court. The plaintiff argued that since the
supreme court had no original jurisdiction to hear the matter"
the power to annul should be vested in the district court which
first had jurisdiction over the cause. This contention was held to
be untenable. 5 Thus under this decision, if A procures a judg-
ment against B by fraud and the judgment is affirmed on appeal
before B discovers the fraud, B has no court in which to seek relief
from the judgment. He cannot bring an action of nullity in the
appellate court, for constitutional limitations on that court's origi-
9. Art. 613, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
10. Succession of Dauphin, 112 La. 103, 36 So. 287 (1904); Emuy v. Farr,
125 La. 825, 51 So. 1003 (1910); Smith v. Williams, 2 La. App. 24 (1925).
11. Hickey v. Duplantier, 4 La. 314 (1832); Bayhl v. Bayhi, 35 La. Ann.
527 (1883); Bruno v. Oviatt, 48 La. Ann. 471, 19 So. 464 (1896); Caldwell v.
Caldwell, 164 La. 458, 114 So. 96 (1937). Cf. Paxton v. Cobb, 2 La. 137 (1831).
12. 2 La. 8 (1830).
13. La. Code of Practice of 1870.
14. La. Const. (1812) Art. IV, § 2, provided that the supreme court should
have appellate jurisdiction only.
15. The court said: "But the Appellee's counsel urges that as this Court
possesses no original jurisdiction, and is Incapable of receiving any from the
Legislature-its judgments may be attacked on the score of nullity, in the
Court which rendered the judgment appealed from, whether affirmed or




nal jurisdiction prohibit such procedure. 6 Neither can B sue to
annul the judgment in the district court; that tribunal would
have no authority to vacate a judgment passed upon by an appel-
late court. He would thus be compelled silently to suffer a fraud
to be perpetrated upon him. It should be noted, however, that if
the judgment is affected with an absolute nullity 7 it may be
attacked collaterally in any court in which the principal demand
is brought,"s even though it has been passed upon by an appellate
court.19
The issues raised by the Melangon case have not been passed
upon again in Louisiana. The opinion however was cited with
approval in a subsequent decision, Succession of Martin v. Suc-
cession of Hoggatt.20 In that case there was an attempt in the dis-
trict court to annul a judgment of the supreme court. It was held
that the district court could not hear the cause. The decision, how-
ever, rests upon the fact that the identical issue of nullity had
been passed upon by the supreme court on a previous hearing.
Consequently, the case cannot be regarded as a reaffirmation of
the doctrine of the Melangon case. Rather it is a simple applica-
tion of the unquestionably sound rule that error of decision on
issues involved in a judgment will not support an action of nul-
lity. 1' If the identical issue of nullity has already been passed
upon, that adjudication will obviously be res judicata 2 and will
bar a subsequent action to annul for the same cause. This, how-
ever, is by no means the case when the cause for nullity has not
been previously urged; in such a situation, the judgment attacked
does not possess the authority of a thing adjudged.2
The Melangon case has been discredited by implication in two
16. Under the present constitution as under the Constitution of 1812,
appellate courts have no original jurisdiction to hear an action of nullity. La.
Const. of 1921, Art. 7, §§ 10, 29.
17. See Art. 606, La. Code of Practice of 1870, and authorities cited in note
4, supra.
18. Edwards v. Whited, 29 La. Ann. 647 (1877); Decuir v. Decuir, 105 La.
481, 29 So. 932 (1901). See Bledsoe v. Erwin, 33 La. Ann. 615, 617-618 (1881).
19. Edwards v. Whited, 29 La. Ann. 647 (1877).
20. 37 La. Ann. 340 (1885). The court said: "The identical ground of
nullity on which our judgment was held to be of no force by the lower court,
had been suggested in bar of plaintiff's right of recovery, had been considered
by us, and disposed of as insufficient for the end proposed by the defendant.
"That element of nullity was therefore no longer an open question.
(37 La. Ann. at 344.)
21. Heroman v. Louisiana Institute of Deaf and Dumb, 34 La. Ann. 805
(1882); Gumbel v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 190 La. 904, 183 So. 212 (1938).
22. State ex rel. Marrero v. Judge of the Twenty-Sixth District Court, 35
La. Ann. 214 (1883).
23. Edwards v. Edwards, 29 La. Ann. 597 (1877); Holbrook v. Holbrook,
32 La. Ann. 13 (1880); Lirette v. Lirette, 176 La. 368, 145 So. 773 (1933).
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later decisions.24 The rule is obviously a harsh and unconscionable
one. However, its effect is only to limit the action to annul on the
ground of relative vices. If the vice complained of is an absolute
one, the judgment may be attacked collaterally in any court,25
and the fact that the venue of the direct action to annul might be
restricted to the court which rendered the judgment26 is unimpor-
tant. Since, however, a relative nullity is subject only to a direct
attack, articles of the Code of Practice bearing upon actions to
annul because of relative nullities should be examined to deter-
mine whether the Melangon case represents a proper application
of those provisions. Article 607 provides:
"A definite judgment may be annulled in all cases where it
appears that it has been obtained through fraud, or other ill
practices .... ." (Italics supplied.)
From this language it appears that the legislative intent was
that the remedy be complete-that no person aggrieved by such a
judgment should be left without recourse. If the legislature in-
tended that the supreme court should have original jurisdiction to
hear actions to annul its own judgments, the doctrine of the
Melangon case is sound. The articles of the Code would then have
been designed to afford a complete remedy, and the maxim in-
clusio unius est exclusio alterius would clearly preclude any other
mode of attack. Under this view, the limitation placed by the
Melangon case on the action to annul would then be regarded as
of a purely constitutional nature. Did the legislature intend that
the articles setting forth the courts in which the action to annul
24. Grivot v. Louisiana State Bank, 31 La. Ann. 467 (1879); Walker v.
Barelli, 32 La. Ann. 1159 (1880). In the Grivot case an action of nullity was
brought in the district court to annul a judgment of the supreme court-the
latter tribunal disposed of the case on other grounds without inquiry as to
the propriety of the proceedings in the lower court. In the Barell case the
court said: "Whatever may be said of the soundness of this decision [the
MeZangon case] so far as it denies jurisdiction [to annul a judgment of the
supreme court] to the District Court, it certainly cannot be claimed that ft
asserts or admits such jurisdiction in this Court."
"As to the jurisdiction of the District Court, we find no subsequent case
reiterating the doctrine, and in the case of Grivot v. Bank, 31 A. 467, its
authority was impliedly disregarded." (32 La. Ann. at 1161.)
25. Edwards v. Whited, 29 La. Ann. 647 (1877); Decuir v. Decuir, 105 La.
481, 29 So. 932 (1901). See Bledsoe v. Erwin, 33 La. Ann. 615, 617-618 (1881).
26. "If it was a suit merely for nullity of the judgment, it was one which
could be brought only before the court which rendered that judgment, and
which that court alone was competent to decide."
"If the charge of nullity had been coupled with a main and controlling
demand, the question of validity of judgment could be inquired into and
determined by any court having jurisdiction of that demand ... " Bledsoe v.
Erwin, 33 La. Ann. 615, 617-618 (1881).
27. See authorities cited in note 11, supra.
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may be brought should apply to judgments of appellate courts?
If it did not, the provision of Article 607, that the annulment may
be obtained in all cases specified, would eliminate any idea that
the limitations of Article 608 relative to the proper venue of pro-
ceedings to annul were exclusive. There would then be no posi-
tive law on the subject of procedure to annul a judgment of an
appellate court. Consequently, since the district court has un-
limited original jurisdiction, 2 it would appear that Article 607,
providing that the nullity may be demanded in all cases, would
be adequate to vest authority in that tribunal to hear the action
of nullity.29
Some weight is added to this view by the articles dealing
with the procedure for annulling a judgment pending appeal.
As we have already observed, Article 608 provides that the
nullity may be demanded from the court rendering the judgment
or from the court to which an appeal is 'taken. Article 609 pro-
vides:
"The' nullity can be demanded on the appeal, only while the
appeal is still pending, and when the nullity is apparent on the
face of the records." (Italics supplied.)
In view of the language of these articles it may be said that the
legislative intent was to limit the jurisdiction of appellate courts
regarding the action of nullity to cases before them on appeal.
Further, the language of Article 611 that "Though there has been
no appeal... the nullity... may yet be demanded... before the
court which has rendered the same," perhaps warrants the con-
clusion that by "court which has rendered the same" is meant
simply the trial court and does not embrace appellate courts.
Conceding that the provisions of the Code of Practice setting
forth the procedure to be followed in the action of nullity are
exclusive, further doubt may be cast upon the decision in the
Melangon case. The rule enunciated there seems to rest upon the
theory that a judgment passed upon by an appellate court be-
comes the judgment of that court. Therefore, since under Article
608 the proper court in which to proceed would be the one which
rendered the vicious judgment, a district court has no authority
28. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, §J 35, 81.
29. The situation would be the same as that presented when any other
cause of action is created by statute without any special provision as to
venue being made. Under this theory the proper venue would be governed by




to annul a judgment of an appellate court. Under the circum-
stances, it would appear that a more reasonable and workable
interpretation was available. The court might well have inter-
preted the phrase "court which rendered the same" as meaning
the court rendering the judgment which first had jurisdiction of
the cause. Such a construction would do no violence to the letter
of the law and furthermore comports well with the other provi-
sions of the Code of Practice relating to the nullity of judgments.
Either of these arguments might have been seized upon by
the court in the Melangon case in order to avoid creating this
unfortunate hiatus in our law. If the ruling in that decision is to
be followed, the only way remaining to obviate the difficulty is
an amendment to Article 608 expressly empowering the district
courts to annul judgments of appellate courts.
KENNETH J. BAILEY
THE EFFECT OF ARTICLE 2462 OF THE
LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE
The meaning of Article 2462 of the Louisiana Civil Code and
its equivalent1 in the French Civil Code has been the subject of
much controversy. It is the purpose of this study to consider the
rules of agreements relating to sales in order to ascertain the
meaning of the article and to see how it has been applied. It will
first be necessary to examine briefly the theories of the French
writers on the article from which Article 2462 was taken.
FRENCH LAW
ARTICLE 1589, FRENCH Civm CODE:
La promesse de vente vaut vente, lorsqu'il y a consentement
rdciproque des deux parties sur a la chose et sur le prix.
(Translation) The promise of sale amounts to a sale, when
there exists reciprocal consent of the two parties on the thing
and on the price.2
In order to understand the interpretations that have been
given to the above article, it is necessary to look briefly at the
rules existing in French customary law. A sale or a contract of
1. Art. 1589, French Civil Code.
2. Cf. Art. 2437, La. Civil Code of 1825.
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